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decision. 14 In this case there was a contract of insurance containing
the usual condition that notice should be immediately given, a breach
thereof, followed by acts amounting to a waiver, which was in turn
followed by the negotiation of a "non-waiver" agreement. The agreement recited that the insurance company
"By undertaking the investigation and defense, of the suit
instituted by the injured party against the insured, does not
waive any condition of the policy * * * and in the event of

any claim or suit under said policy, for indemnity or for any
other purpose, it shall not be claimed that the said insurance
company has by an act or conduct waived any provision or
condition of its policy or that it is estopped from setting up
any defense or defenses it may have."
It was held that continuance in the action brought by the injured
party against the insured, by the insurance company with knowledge
of the breach, constituted a waiver, and as tlhe defendant was bound
to defend at the time of the execution of the non-waiver agreement,
the implied promise to continue in defense was no consideration.
True, there was no consideration, but a waiver need not be supported by consideration. 15 Was not the signing of the agreement by
the insured an express declaration to waive the right it had to rely on
the waiver of its breach by the insurance company?
It seems that the Court did not exhaust all the possibilities of
the defense for there is the strongest possible evidence,-a written
agreement-of "an intentional relinquishment of a known right" 16 by
the plaintiff.
The apparent inclination to favor the insured as reflected in the
innumerable cases on the subject of insurance should not outweigh
the logical results of sound judicial reasoning.
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The general scheme of the Workmen's Compensation Law has
been repeatedly upheld by the highest court of this state and the
11226 A. D. 516 (1st Dept., 1929).
' Supra Notes 7, 10.
Rice v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 103 Fed. 427 (C. C. A. 8th,
1900); Kent v. Warner, 94 Mass. 536 (1868); West v. Platt, 127 Mass. 372
(1897); Dawson v. Shillock, 29 Minn. 191, 12 N. W. 526 (1882); Portland
Ry. Co. v. Spillman, 23 Ore. 587, 32 Pac. 688 (1893); Hecht v. Brandus, 4
Misc. 58, 23 N. Y. Supp. 1004 (1893); Krivitsky S. Cohen, Inc. v. Western
Union, 129 Misc. 431, 221 N. Y. Supp. 525 (1927) ; Ansorge v. Belfer, 248 N. Y.
145, 161 N. E. 450 (1928); Boynton v. Brailey, 54 Vt. 92 (1881).
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Supreme Court of the United States.' Yet individual sections thereof
continue to be challenged as to their constitutionality.
In a recent decision, Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. The Staten Island
Rapid Transit Railway Co.,2 the validity of Subdivisions 8 and 9 of
Section 15 3 and Section 29 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Law
was in question. In this case the defendant, a third party, caused the
death of an employee of plaintiff's insured. His widow elected to
proceed against the present defendant instead of accepting the compensation award. A settlement was effected by which the widow
received $15,000, which was more than she would have been entitled
to under the Compensation Law. Defendant at that time received a
general release in full settlement of all claims. Plaintiff, thereafter,
had to pay $500.00 into each of two special funds provided for by
Subdivisions 8 and 9 of Section 15 and now seeks to recover the sums
thus expended, from the defendant, relying on Section 29 of the
Compensation Law.5
The particular question presented by the case is whether or not
the Legislature is prevented by constitutional limitation from imposing the burden of contributing to these special funds on a third person
in no industrial relationship to the deceased and thereby impose an
additional liability on a tort feasor after he has obtained a general
release in full settlement of all claims arising from his wrongful act.
The right of the state to create such funds for additional compensation in particularly needy cases and for vocational rehabilitation
1

N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247,

61 L. ed. 667 (1916) ; Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E.
600 (1915), rev'd on other grounds 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524, 61

L. ed. 1086 (1916).

2251 N. Y. 127, 2 N. E. 194 (1929), aff'g 224 App. Div. 346, 230 N. Y.
Supp. 747 (1928).
' Sec. 15. Schedule in Case of Disability. The following schedule of compensation is hereby established. * * *
8. Permanent total disability after permanent partial disability. If
an employee who has previously incurred permanent partial disability
through the loss of one hand, one arm, one foot, one eye, incurs permanent disability through the loss of another member or organ, he shall be
paid, in addition * * * out of a special fund created for such purpose in
the following manner: The insurance carrier shall pay to the state treas-

urer for every case of injury causing death in which there are no persons

entitled to compensation the sum of five hundred dollars. The state
treasurer shall be the custodian of this special fund and the commissioner
shall direct the distribution thereof.
9. (Provides for the expenses of rehabilitating injured employees
and requires the insurance carrier to pay to the state treasurer the sum

of $500. under the same terms as contained in subd. 8 above.)
'Sec. 29. Subrogation to remedies of employees. * * * In case of the

payment of an award to the state treasurer in accordance with subdivisions eight
and nine of section fifteen such payment shall operate to give to the employer
or insurance carrier liable for the award a cause of action.
r Supra Note 4.
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has been previously upheld. 6 In Sheehan v. Shuler,7 appellant had
insisted that enforced contributions into these funds by a stranger to
the industrial relationship existing between employer and employee
was in violation of the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses
of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, held
that these funds which served as additional compensation in particularly needy cases were necessary to further the benevolent purposes
of the Compensation Law and that enforced contributions up to the
amount of $1,000.00 from employers or their insurance carriers were
not unjust nor unreasonable when such employer or insurer was not
forced to pay compensation to anyone else. The amount thus contributed is less than the average amount the employer or insurer would
be obliged to pay if there were dependents taking. This case conclusively decided that the provisions were not in conflict with the "due
process" and "equal protection" clauses.8 That these particular subdivisions are permitted by and do not violate Article I Section 19 of
the New York State Constitution had been previously decided. 9
Payments into the funds have been enforced although the decreased left dependents entitled to compensation awards when such dependents have not claimed death benefits 10 or have recovered damages
in excess of compensation from a third party "1 or have failed to
receive death benefits because their claims were not filed within the
statutory period 12 and even though the injured employee received
compensation but died leaving no dependents.' 3
Unquestionably the creation of these funds was within the
prerogative of the Legislature and should have been and was correctly
upheld to further the humanitarian purposes of the Compensation
Law.' 4 But the Legislature, through the medium of Section 29, has
advanced further, and has created a new liability, imposing on the
wrongdoer additional liability when the situation comes within the
purview of this section.
'Watkinson v. Hotel Pennsylvania, 195 App. Div. 624, 187 N. Y. Supp.
(1921) ; R. E. Sheehan Co. v. Geo. K. Shuler, State Treasurer, et al., 236 N. Y.
579, 142 N. E. 291 (1923), aff'd 265 U. S.371, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548 (1924).
Supra Note 6.
'N.Y. State Ry. Co. v. Shuler, 265 U. S.379, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 551, 68

278 (3rd Dept.. 1921), aff'd 231 N. Y. 562, 132 N. E. 889, 20 A. L. R. 1003

L. ed. 1064 (1924).

"State Industrial Commission v. Newman, 222 N. Y. 363, 118 N. E.
794 (1918).
"State Treas. v. West Side Trucking Co., 198 App. Div. 432, 191 N. Y.

Supp. 346 (3rd Dept., 1921), aff'd 233 N. Y. 202, 135 N. E. 244 (1922).
1923).U Miller v. Rochester Gas and Elec. Co., 206 App. Div. 723 (3rd Dept.,
"Laird v. Sterling Oil Co., 207 App. Div. 878, 201 N. Y. Supp. 917 (3rd
Dept, 1923) ; Brectinger v. Sens, 207 App. Div. 880, 201 N. Y. Supp. 946 (3rd

Dept., 1923).
Steuffler v. Rheinfrank Co., 190 App. Div. 163, 179 N. Y. Supp. 659
(3rd Dept., 1919).

"ISupra Note 6.
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At common law there was no civil action surviving the deceased
for his wrongful death.' 5 The right of action for such death is created
solely by statute.' 6 Within constitutional limitations statutes are the
exclusive sources and boundary of liability for damages for wrongful
death and the remedy.' 7 They may create the cause of action, define
the period of its existence and the party by whom and the method in
which it shall be 8enforced and prescribe the measure of damages and
the beneficiaries.'
The United States Supreme Court has held that constitutional
rights, like others, are matters of degree and provisions for the protection of property are not to be pushed to a logical extreme but must
be taken to permit the infliction of some relatively small losses without compensation for some of the purposes of wholesome legislation. 19
"Any plan devised by the will of man may, in exceptional
cases, work unjustly, but the act is to be judged by its general
plan and scope and the general good to be promoted by it." 20
The various Workmen's Compensation Laws imposing new liabilities are familiar examples of the legislative creation of new rights
and duties for the prevention of evils arising out of our highly
developed industrial age or for satisfying social and economic needs:
"Their constitutionality may not be successfully challenged
merely because a change in the common law is effected. * * *
We cannot say it is beyond the power of the Legislature, in
effecting such a change in common law rules, to attempt to
preserve human life by making homicide expensive. It may
impose an extraordinary liability, * * * not only upon those at
fault but upon those who, although not directly culpable, are
able, nevertheless, in the management of their affairs, to guard
substantially against the evil to be prevented." 21
It is within the power of the Legislature to create a new
cause of action unknown to the common law. In our opinion it is
Meekin v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 164 N. Y. 145, 58 N. E. 50, 51
L. R. A. 235 (1900).
"Travelers Ins. Co. v. Podula, 224 N. Y. 397, 121 N. E. 348 (1918) ; In re
Meng, 227 N. Y. 264, 125 N. E. 508 (1919); Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co., 23
N. Y. 465 (1861) ; Hamilton v. Erie R. R. Co., 219 N. Y. 343, 114 N. E. 399,
Ann. Cases 1918A, 928 (1916).
"'7SupraNote 16.
'Snpra Note 16.
" Interstate Consol. St. Ry. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79, 28 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 26, 52 L. ed. 111 (1907), aff'g 187 Mass. 436, 73 N. E. 530 (1905).
'Per Miller, J., in Jensen v. South. Pac. Co., supra Note 1 at 528, 109
N. E. at 604.
' Louis Lizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U. S. 112 at 116, 47 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 509 at 510, 71 L. ed. 952 at 954, 51 A. L. R 1379 (1927).
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not an unreasonable exercise of such legislative prerogative to create
a new cause of action against a wrongdoer responsible for death by
means of which such wrongdoer is compelled to contribute to the
funds employed to effectuate the benevolent and charitable purposes
of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
SIDNEY MOERMAN.

AN APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
FOR PERSONAL SERVICES.

The general rule applicable under common law and under the
statutes 1 of the several states is that actions based on contract survive the death of either party and may be enforced by or against his
heirs or executors.2 It is with the exception to this well-established
exception found in contracts inrule that we are concerned-the
3
volving personal services.
That one may choose with whom he will contract is a basic principle of law. The courts early recognized 4 that when people contract
with each other for services essentially personal no assignment or
substitution can be satisfactory, and the original party cannot be
succeeded by his personal representative. A personal service contract
requires the exercise of personal skill and knowledge, it cannot be
delegated to another.3 The long line of authorities has led to the
crystallization of the rule in Lorillard v. Clyde,6 followed by later
decisions, in which the Court laid the test to determine whether a
given case fitted within this exception. The Court said:
"It is well settled that when performance depends on the
continued existence of a given person or thing and such continued existence was assumed as the basis of the agreement,
'New York State Decedent Estate Law, Sec. 16, L. 1909, ch. 18.
aC. J. 181, Sec. 326; Livermore v. Bainbridge, 49 N. Y. 125 (1872);
Zabriski v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322, 64 Amer. D. 551 (1855); Robinson v.
Thomas, 123 App. Div. 411, 107 N. Y. Supp. 110 (1908); McGregor v.
McGregor, 35 N. Y. 218 (1866); Allen v. Confederate Pub. Co., 49 S. E.
782, 121 Ga. 773 (1905) ; White v. Allen, 133 Mass. 423 (1882) ; McCartney
v. Corbine's Estate. 108 I1. App. 282 (1903).
'Lorillard v. Clyde et al., 142 N. Y. 456, 37 N. E. 489, 24 L. R. A. 113
(1894) ; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, 7 Amer. Rep. 415 (1871) ; Spaulding
v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40, 27 Amer. Rep. 7 (1877); Wheeler v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins.,
82 N. Y. 543, 37 Amer. Rep. 549 (1880); Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489,
44 N. E. 167 (1896).
'Babcock v. Goodrich, 3 How. Pr. (N. S.) 52.
'3 Williston, Contracts 3299.
'Supra Note 3.

